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The Minority Game is a well known agent-based model with no explicit interaction among its
agents. However, it is known that they interact through the global magnitudes of the model and
through their strategies. In this work we have attempted to formalize the implicit interactions
among Minority Game agents as if they were links on a complex network. We have defined the
link between two agents by quantifying the similarity between them. This link definition is based
on the information of the instance of the game (the set of strategies assigned to each agent at the
beginning) without any dynamic information on the game, and brings about a static, unweighed
and undirected network. We have analyzed the structure of the resulting network for different
parameters, such as the number of agents (N) and the agent’s capacity to process information (m),
always taking into account games with two strategies per agent. In the region of crowd-effects of
the model, the resulting networks structure is a small world network, whereas in the region where
the behavior of the Minority Game is the same as in a game of random decisions, networks become
a random network of Erdos-Renyi. The transition between these two types of networks is slow,
without any peculiar feature of the network in the region of the coordination among agents. Finally,
we have studied the resulting static networks for the Full Strategy Minority Game model, a maximal
instance of the Minority Game in which all possible agents take part in the game. We have explicitly
calculated the degree distribution of the Full Strategy Minority Game network and, on the basis
of this analytical result, we have estimated the degree distribution of the Minority Game network,
which is in accordance with computational results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the first attemps to use tools of mathemat-
ics to study problems from the social world is originated
by the work of J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern,
who applied the game theory to economical phenomenons
[1]. Later, works of Axelrod gave an important impulse
to the agent-based models [2, 3]. One of the questions
followed by Axelrod is to understand if the cooperation
can emerge in a system of selfish individuals. Recently,
from statistical physics, a lot of works addressed the is-
sues of cooperation under the framework of the social
dilemmas [4, 5]. In some situations, individuals compete
for resources which are limited, like in traffic problems.
The Minority Game falls in this framework of competing
agents with limited resources. It was introduced in 1997
by Challet and Zhang as an attempt to pick some essen-
tial characteristics of a competitive population, in which
an individual achieves the best result when he manages
to be in the minority group [6, 7]. They are inspired in
El Farol Problem [8]. The Minority Game is an adaptive
agent-based model, and presents emergent properties like
coordination among agents under certain circumstances.
The original model was formulated as follows: there
are N agents that in each t step of the game must choose
one of two alternatives (0 or 1, for example). Once
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agents have played, it is necessary to count how many
of them went to each side, (N1(t) and N0(t) so that
N1(t)+N0(t) = N for all values of t) and the winners are
those who happen to be in the minority group (the mini-
mum value between N1(t) and N0(t)). The only informa-
tion available for the agents is the state of the system µ,
that is one of the H possible patterns labeled for an in-
teger value µ = 1, ...,H. Agents play using strategies. A
strategy is a function that assigns a prediction (0 or 1) to
each of the possible states. In this way, there are L = 2H
different strategies; the set of L strategies defines the so-
called Full Strategy Space (FSS). At the beginning of the
game, each agent randomly chooses s strategies from the
FSS. In this paper, we will work with s = 2. As strate-
gies are chosen with repetition, it is possible for an agent
to have two identical strategies, and for two agents to
have the same pair of strategies. In the original formu-
lation, µ is an endogenous variable determined by the
sides which turn out to be the minority ones in the last
m steps of the game. Therefore, the number of states is
H = 2m. Every agent receives one point every time he
manages to be in the minority group. On the other hand,
agents also record whether their strategies were good or
bad. They assign a virtual point (to distinguish it from
the points assigned to the agents) to the strategies which
correctly predicted the side that resulted minority for a
given step, regardless of the fact that the strategy may or
may not have been used. At every step, the agent chooses
the best strategy to play (the one that accumulated the
most virtual points up to that time). When two or more
2strategies have scored equally well, the agent randomly
chooses one of them.
Many works have studied the effect which a definition
of the state based on exogenous information has on the
behavior of the model [9–11]. For example, Cavagna pro-
posed a new updating rule for the state of the system
[9] (here denoted MGrand) consisting of choosing one of
the H states at random from an uniform distribution at
every step of the game. The behavior of the MGrand
essentially turns out to be the same as that of the MG
[11, 12]. Moreover, this model has allowed to carry out
analytical approaches [13, 14].
An instance I of the MG with s = 2 is a partic-
ular assignment of two strategies to the agents, I =
{(e11, e12), (e21, e22), · · · }. For i = 1, . . . , N , the pair (ei1, ei2)
represents the set of strategies assigned to the agent
i. We define a realization E of the game as a pair
E = {SE , I}, where SE = {µ˜1, µ˜2, · · · } is a sequence of
states (generated by any updating rule), and I is an in-
stance of the MG. We will follow this notation proposed
in previous works ([15] for example).
The most studied variable of the MG is the so called re-
duced variance σ2/N = 〈(N1(t)−N/2)2/N〉E , a measure
of the population’s squandering of resources [7]. It mea-
sures the population’s waste of resources by averaging –
over time and over different realizations E– the quadratic
deviation from N/2 of the number of agents that choose
a fixed side (for example, N1). If s is fixed for a game, σ
could depend on two parameters, N and m. However, it
has been found that the relevant control parameter of the
model is α = H/N = 2m/N [16]. The magnitude σ2/N
shows scaling as a function of α, and the model presents a
phase transition with symmetry breaking. Ref [17] shows
that the transition occurs when σ2/N reaches its lowest
value, at αc, and separates the symmetric (α < αc) from
the asymmetric (α > αc) phase. The broken symmetry is
the equivalence of the two sides: in the symmetric phase
〈N1(t)|µ〉 = 0 for all µ state values, while in the asym-
metric phase,〈N1(t)|µ〉 6= 0 at least for one µ state. This
means that the minority side becomes predictable. The
behavior of the MG for α ≫ 1 is equivalent to that of a
game in which agents take decisions at random. In this
way, σ2/N ≈ 0.25. In the region where α ≪ 1, crowd
effects arise at some steps of the game. These crowds
of agents moving together to one of the two sides turn
out to be the majority and are, of course, the losers; at
this point where crowds emerge, the contribution to σ is
very important. Then, crowds effects are the reason why
σ is a large number in this region, a fact which shows
that fewer resources are allocated to the population as a
whole. Period Two Dynamics (PTD) in the sequence of
the minority sides was first observed within this region
by Savit et al. [16] . The dynamics established in this re-
gion enables the number of virtual points assigned to the
strategies to be reduced to a limited set of cases [15, 18],
which facilitates the analytical treatment of the model.
One of the reasons why the Minority Game has attracted
attention is that in certain region of the parameters, the
reduced variance is smaller than that obtained for a game
in which each of the agents randomly chooses between the
two sides (see Figure 1), meaning a better use of the re-
sources by the population. But it is interesting to note
that the reduced variance reflects that the population as
a whole achieves more resources, but does not reveal how
that wealth is distributed among the agents. Ho et al.
redefined a Gini index for theMG [19] which showed that
whenever the reduced variance takes its minimum value,
the inequality among the agents is maximized.
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FIG. 1. Reduced variance (σ2/N) as a function of the control
parameter (α = H/N = 2m/N) for the MG for different val-
ues of m (from 2 to 14) and N agents (plus symbols for 1001,
triangle for 501 and X for 101 case). For each value of N and
m, 100 runs have been performed, each one of T = 100000
time steps discarding the first 50000 steps. Dash line corre-
sponds to the case of random decisions. Regions of crowd-
effects, coordination and random decisions are highlighted.
In a recent work [15], we studied crowd region and
presented a calculation of σ that matched the simulation
results. This calculation was based on the FSMG (Full
Strategy Minority Game), an imaginary instance of the
MG where all the possible agents (let call N ) participate
in the game. As a consequence, a lot of symmetries could
be exploited to obtain an explicit analytical solution for
the magnitude σ. Once the FSMG was solved, we ob-
tained results for σ for the MG (in the region in which
PTD is valid) by sampling N agents from the N agents
of the FSMG. Additionally, in a more recent work, we
analyzed two well-known properties: quasiperiodicity of
the sequence of outcomes of the game and Period Two
Dynamics, by studying the sequence of minority sides
through a network and by using the FSMG to shed light
on these properties [20].
The MG has been studied using very different tools:
numerical simulations [6][7][16], a generalization with a
temperature-like variable [21], a mapping of the model
to a spin glass [14], to mention just a few.
In recent years, many areas of science have become
3highly interested in the properties of complex networks
of very different complex systems, which include com-
munication, biochemical, ecosystems, internet and social
networks, among others [22] [23] [24]. If we think about
individuals as nodes and their interactions as links, the
social world around us can be represented as a social net-
work.
Different extensions of the MG allow agents to ac-
cess to information from their neighborhood, by includ-
ing explicit interactions and the exchange of information
among agents [25][26]. For example, in [27], µi is de-
fined for the agent i by taking into account the output
move of i− agent’s neighbors, as if they were boolean
agents. Recently, in [28], authors studied a system of
boolean agents playing a generalized minority game. In
[29], authors studied the evolution of the networked evo-
lutionary minority game (NEMG), where each agent can
evolve his strategies taking into account information from
his neighbors. In [30], connections between agents are
dynamically inserted or removed from the network. In
[31], authors applied the crowd-anticrowd theory to the
NEMG. In [32], we introduced some degree of local in-
formation, which is only available for some agents in an
ordered network. In all these works, agents’neghborhood
had been provided by a complex network before the game
had started (althout it can evolve in some generaliza-
tions), partially changing the original rules of the game
by introducing explicit interactions. These works studied
how different network organizations affect the dynamics
of the generalized MG, using ordered, random, small-
world and scale-free networks.
In this work, we have proposed to characterize the
implicit interactions among the MG agents which are
established from the instance of the game (before the
game started) on a static complex network. Agents play
the original rules of the MG, without the context of
the neighborhood or explicit interactions. We have not
changed the rules of the game, but represented implicit
interactions of the MG as links on a network. We were
inspired by two strongly related questions which are usu-
ally asked in other complex systems: What is the under-
lying complex network that connects individuals in this
system like? and, Is the structure of this network related
to different properties of the system behavior?.
We have defined a link between two agents by quan-
tifying the similarity between their set of strategies. In
section II, we present the chosen definition for the link,
and the properties of the obtained networks. In section
III, we will analyze the network of the FSMG, given the
same link definition for the MG, and we will analytically
calculate the degree distribution of these networks as a
function of m. In the same section, we will describe how
we have estimated the degree distribution of the MG net-
works from the analytical results for those of the FSMG.
In section IV we will present our conclusions.
II. THE UNDERLYING NETWORK OF THE
MINORITY GAME
Agents will be represented by nodes and the link be-
tween a pair of nodes is established whenever certain con-
dition is given for both sets of the agents’ strategies.
Before introducing the definition of the link, we need
to define the Hamming distance between two strategies:
the Hamming distance between a pair of strategies e1 and
e2, d(e1, e2), is the number of bits in which they dif-
fer, normalized by the length of the strategy (measured
by the number of bits). For example, the Hamming dis-
tance between the two strategies e1 = (1, 1, 0, 0) and
e2 = (1, 1, 1, 1) is d(e1, e2) = 1/2. Let us note that pre-
vious strategies correspond to a game with m = 2 and
therefore there are H = 4 states, that is why each strat-
egy assigns four predictions, one for each possible state.
For games with two strategies per agent, we will es-
tablish a link Lij = 1 between agents i and j, whose
strategies are (ei1, e
i
2) and (e
j
1, e
j
2), if the condition
d(eik, e
j
l ) <
1
2
(1)
is met for all k and l values, such as k=1,2 and l=1,2.
This means that there will be a link between two agents
if, whichever strategy each agent chooses to play, the
Hamming distance between those strategies is less than
1/2. Let us note that this definition does not use any
dynamic information, but the complete set of available
strategies for the agents. In a context of ergodicity of
the game (each state occurs with equal probability), the
following is valid: Lij = 1 if and only if agents i and j
play the same side more than one half of the time steps.
In a context of non-ergodicity, the previously-mentioned
statement does not apply. Lij = 1 does not imply any-
thing about the moves of agents i and j, because they
could be frozen agents who use only one of their strate-
gies, and the system could concentrate on only a set of
states. Conversely, two agents l and k could play the
same side more than one half of the time steps and yet,
Lij may still be equal to 0.
In [20] we showed that a MG with a deterministic
rule to play in case of a tie of the strategies for which
the SPTD (Strict Period Two Dynamics, the PTD with
probability equal to 1) for even occurrences of the states
is met, is a periodic game. For example, it applies to the
MGprior where agents have an a priori favorite strategy
to use in case of tie. We proved that if the MG is pe-
riodic and meets the SPTD for the even occurrences of
the states, then all the states appear in the period the
same even number of times, which implies the ergodicity
of the game (see theorem 4 in section 4 of [20]). Then,
Lij = 1 ensures that agents i and j play the same side
more than one half of the time steps. Moreover the pe-
riod length P can be written as P = 2nH, being n an
integer number ≥ 1. This deterministic version of the
MG leaves the same behavior of the MG, a fact which is
4evidenced in simulations of σ2/N , which show the same
curve as in the MG case. The only difference appears in
the fluctuations of the reduced variance of the MGprior,
which are bigger than in the MG case.
This definition of link leads to an unweighed and undi-
rected network. To find the network of connections for
a particular game, we have generated an instance of the
game (an allocation of strategies for both values of N and
m), and looked at the resulting K connections complying
with a previous definition of the link (1). These two sets,
the nodes (set of agents) {n1, n2, ...nN} and the connec-
tions {l1, l2, ...lK}, whose sizes are N and K respectively,
define the associated network of the MG, which we note
GMG(N,K(N,m)), which depends both on the defini-
tion of the link, and on the instance of the game. We
will study the properties of GMG for different parame-
ters of m (ranging from 2 to 14), and N (101, 501, 1001
and 5001), including the degree distribution, the degree
correlation, the clustering coefficient, the average mini-
mum path and some aspects of the clusters structure.
A. Degree distribution and degree correlation
Figure 1 shows the probability of finding links on
the network c = K/(N(N − 1)) = 〈k〉/(N − 1) where
〈k〉 = K/N is the mean degree of the network. Points for
different values of N and the same value of m overlap. c
grows with m up to a stabilization around a value which
is close to but less than 1/16 (in section III, we will return
to this value). Standard deviation of c is shown in the
inset plot of the figure on a different scale. The standard
deviation becomes smaller while N increases; for the case
of N = 5001 the error bar is smaller than the size of the
circle symbol.
Figure 2 shows the degree distribution of GMG for dif-
ferent values of m (m = 3, 5, 8 and 11) and the same
value of N = 1001; the continuous curve in the Figure
corresponds to the theoretical degree distribution for an
Erdos-Renyi network, GER, with N nodes and mean de-
gree 〈k〉I , which is the value obtained by averaging the
mean degree of the GMG over 100 instances. For greater
values of m, connections behave like on a random net-
work, as reflected by the degree distribution for the case
of m = 11 for N = 1001 which matches those of an Er-
dos Renyi network. Hence, from m = 9 to m = 14, using
the Pearson’s Chi-square test, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the observed degree distribution of GMG is
normally distributed with equal mean and variance (see
caption of Figure 2 for details). On the other hand, for
small values of m, the obtained degree distributions are
very different from those of a random network, as can be
seen in the case ofm = 3, where the histogram shows dif-
ferent peaks. This multimodal degree distribution could
be understood using the FSMG in Section III.
Figure 3 shows the degree correlation as a function of
m for different values of N . We have noticed that for
small values of m, networks turn out to be dissortative,
while as m grows, the degree correlation of the network
increases until there is no correlation.
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FIG. 2. Probability of finding links on the MG networks,
< k > /(N−1), vs m for different values of N (circle symbols
for N = 5001 case, plus for 1001, triangle for 501 and X
for 101 case). Each point correspond to an average value over
100 instances. Inset of the figure show the standard deviations
for the values of the probability of finding a link by using the
same symbols as in the main figure. The case of N = 5001
presents an error bar which is lower than the symbol size of
main figure.
We understand a cluster as the set of nodes V of the
network for which for each pair of them v, u ∈ V , u 6= v,
there exists a directed path from v to u throughout the
network. For values of m greater than 4, for values of
N = 5001, 1001 and 501, and m = 8 for N = 101,
GMG turn out to be connected networks (with only one
cluster).
B. Clustering and minimum mean path
We have also calculated the clustering coefficient and
the minimum average path for GMG. The clustering co-
efficient takes into account the biggest cluster of the net-
work if it is not connected. We have studied the cluster-
ing in terms of m and N and we have found that MG
networks for various values of N show roughly the same
clustering in terms of m, as shown in black symbols of
Figure 5. For example, for the case of m = 6, clus-
tering coefficient of GMG for different values of N =
101, 501, 1001, 5001 are very similar, as it is shown in
the inset figure (error bars correspond to the standard
deviation which is lower as N grows), and using a χ2
statistical test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis H0:
“the values of clustering coefficient obtained from GMG
for N = 101, 501, 1001 and 5001 are mutually consistent
(i.e., correspond to variables with the same mean value)”
for any value of m from 2 to 14 (see details in the cap-
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FIG. 3. In gray, degree distribution of MG networks for (a):
m = 3 , (b): m = 5, (c): m = 8 and (d): m = 11 for
N = 1001, averaged over 100 different instances. The contin-
uous black curves correspond to the degree distributions for
equivalent Erdos Renyi networks, where we approximate the
Poisson distribution with a Normal distribution N(µ, σ) with
the parameters µ =< k > and σ =
√
< k >, where < k > is
the value obtained by averaging the mean degree of the GMG
over 100 instances. We performed a Pearson’s Chi-square sta-
tistical test in order to check the null hypothesis H0: “data
observed of degree distribution of GMG are distributed like in
random networks, i.e. a normal distribution with equal mean
and variance”. We computed the statistical value X2 as the
weighed sum of the squared deviations from the number of
events observed and expected in each class of the histogram,
i.e., X2 =
∑l
i=1 (ni − np0i)2/npoi where ni is the number of
observed events in class i and np0i is the predicted number
of events in the class i, being n the total number of events,
and p0i the predicted probability of class i for the underlying
distribution. In our case, we are testing that this is a Nor-
mal distribution with equal mean and variance µ which has
been estimated from the same set of data. When H0 is true,
X2 is approximately a χ2l−2 Chi-square distribution with l−2
degrees of freddon (because of the constrait of the normal-
ization condition of p0i and the parameter µ estimated from
data) [33]. We can reject H0 for m = 8 case with significance
level smaller than 0.1%, in which case the normalized statis-
tics (X2n = X
2/(l−2) which is expected value 1) is: X2n = 2.43
and l = 67. Form = 9, . . . , 14 we cannot reject the hypothesis
H0 because the values obtained for the normalized statistics
are: X2n = 0.38 and l = 63 for m = 9, X
2
n = 0.15 and l = 61
for m = 10, X2n = 0.135 and l = 61 for m = 11, X
2
n = 0.127
and l = 64 for m = 12, X2n = 0.132 and l = 63 for m = 13,
finally X2n = 0.128 and l = 62 for m = 14 case.
tion of the figure 5). On the other hand MG clustering
is greater than the corresponding value for random net-
works for values ofm up to m = 9−10. In Figure 5, gray
symbols represent values of link probability previously re-
ported in order to appreciate that for greater values of
m, the clustering coefficient is very similar to them (al-
though a little greater), as occurs in random networks
where there is no correlation. The dashed line on the
figure corresponds to the value 1/16.
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FIG. 4. Degree correlation of GMG as a function of m for
different values of N (circle symbols for N = 5001 case, plus
for 1001, triangle for 501 and X for 101 case). Each point
corresponds to an average value over 100 instances. Inset
shows values of standard deviation of the degree correlation
in a log scale by using the same symbols.
As observed in real networks, high clustering is typi-
cal of networks where the link represents a social rela-
tionship, such as in friendship networks (it is very likely
somebody’s friends are also friends to one another). In
the case of MG, we have seen this feature for small values
of m, more precisely, in the region where crowd effects
emerge, and make the system inefficient in the use of
resources. As m grows, although the number of connec-
tions increases, clustering reflects that these connections
are allocated without transitivity; in other words, the
probability that two neighbors of a node are connected
to each other is the same as the probability of finding a
link on a random network, where there is no correlation.
We have calculated the average shortest path length
of GMG and compared it with the corresponding values
for GER, for all the values of N and m we have worked
with. Figure 6 shows that the minimum average path
of GMG coincides with that of GER for all values of m
greater than m = 5, and it is close to this value for lower
values of m . Given the values of clustering, minimum
average path, degree correlation and the degree distribu-
tion, we can say that for small values of m (when crowds
emerge), the MG network is a small world network, while
for greater values of m, GMG behaves as a random net-
work. It is remarkable that the instance of the game has
sufficient information to define which of these two cases
the game will fall in. The transition between these two
types of networks is slow, without any peculiar feature
of the network in the region of the coordination among
agents. Perhaps the instance (i.e. static) network may
not be sufficient to offer information about this region,
and it might be necessary to consider the dynamic net-
6work, which should be obtained using information related
to the strategies which the agents actually used.
In order to understand aspects of the GMG, we will
analyze the network of a maximal instance of the MG,
the Full Strategy Minority Game, in the next section.
III. THE UNDERLYING NETWORK OF THE
FULL STRATEGY MINORITY GAME
The Full Strategy Minority Game (FSMG) model was
introduced in [15, 18] as an instance of the MG where
its N agents were chosen in a particular way: they are
all possible different agents that could exist by combin-
ing strategies from the set of L = 2H strategies of the
FSS. Thus, for a game with s = 2 strategies per agent,
there are as many agents as possible pairs of strategies
(with repetition) from the FSS. Therefore, for s = 2, the
number of players will depend on m in the form:
N (m) = L+
( L
2
)
= 22
m
+
(
22
m
2
)
=
2H
2
(2H+1) (2)
The first term in the Eq. (2) represents the number
of agents who have two identical strategies and the last
term, the number of agents who have two different strate-
gies. For the sake of simplicity, we will write N instead
of N (m) in the following part of this work. For exam-
ple, in a game with m = 2, FSMG has N = 136 agents.
Ref [15] presents an extensive analysis of the FSMG and
its application to obtain analytical results for the MG
with different updating rules (standard MG, MGrand
just mentioned [9] andMGper, a MG with a periodic up-
dating rule introduced in [34]). Likewise, we have proved
that the FSMG necessarily meets SPTD (Strict Period
Two Dynamics), the PTD with probability equal to 1,
and we have estimated the probability that a MG meets
PTD from this analytical result.
By definition, the network of FSMG, GFSMG, has N
nodes. Let us analyze the resulting network of FSMG,
given the link definition proposed in (1). As N is only a
function of m, the set of connections, K, will also be a
function of m. Then, the network and its properties will
only depend on m, that is why we adopt the following
notation for the FSMG network: GFSMG(N (m),K(m))
(although we use the simplified GFSMG).
At a first stage, in subsection A we describe the ana-
lytical calculation of the degree distribution of GFSMG
as a function of m. At the second stage, in subsection
B, we present the estimation of the degree distribution
of MG networks from this exact result.
A. Calculation of the degree distribution of the
network of the FSMG
Like before (see reference [15]), we will again benefit
from the symmetry of the FSMG model, in which all pos-
sible strategy combinations in pairs (each of them repre-
senting one agent and therefore one node of the GFSMG
network) are present. As a result of this symmetry, the
nodes of the FSMG network can take only a few val-
ues of degree, as we will proceed to prove. In fact, the
number of different possible values of degree is, at most,
2m+1. Actually, in the Appendix we will prove that the
maximum is 2m. For m = 2, for example, there exist
nodes with only degree 0, 2, 3 and 14 on the FSMG net-
work. To understand this, let us divide the set of agents
(nodes) of the FSMG into different subsets, so that all
nodes belonging to a given subset will be the same value
of Hamming distance h between their pair of assigned
strategies. We will show that nodes belonging to the
same subset will have the same number of neighbors on
the network though not the same neighbors and, as a
consequence, they will be the same degree. The degree
of each node from a given subset will be a function of
both h and m.
We define the subset Nh ∈ N as the set of agents
whose pair of strategies show a Hamming distance equal
to h between them. The number of subsets will be
2m + 1, because h can take on the values h ∈ Sh ={
0, 12m ,
2
2m , ..., 1
}
. For example, in a FSMG of m = 2,
there are five subsets, because h can take the values
{0, 14 , 12 , 34 , 1}, in general h = i2m with i being an inte-
ger value in the range [0, 2m].
The symbol Nh stands for the cardinality of a set, i.e.
Nh is the size of the subset Nh. Let us count Nh for each
value of h, which is:
Nh = 2(2m−1)
(
2m
2mh
)
for h > 0 and N0 = 22m (3)
The value of N0 represents the number of agents whose
two strategies are equal. There are exactly L = 22m
agents which meet this condition. Note that N0 is the
same value which appeared in the first term of the Eq.
(2). In order to calculate the size Nh we should count
the number of agents whose two strategies differ in ex-
actly 2mh bits. This means that we need to count how
many pairs of strategies there are so that the two strate-
gies predict both different minority sides for 2mh states,
and the same minority sides for the 2m(1− h) remaining
states. Then Nh for h > 0 results from the product of
three factors, where:
• factor 1 represents all the possible ways of choos-
ing h states in which the pair of strategies make
different predictions, thus:
(
2m
2mh
)
.
• factor 2 represents all the possible predictions for
(1 − h)2m states, that is to say all those in which
the pair of strategies coincide, thus: 22
m(1−h).
• factor 3 represents all the possible ways in which
two strategies predict different minority sides for
7the 2mh states chosen in factor 1 (they can coin-
cide because both strategies predict 1, or because
both predict 0). Then, the dividing factor two is
present because actually the pair of strategies is not
an orderly pair, thus: 22
mh/2.
For a particular m value and h > 0, the product of the
three factors descripted results in expression (3), and the
sum of all subset size will be the number of agents of the
FSMG, thus:
∑
h ∈ Sh
Nh = N (4)
as we will prove in the Appendix.
Now, let us suppose that we choose a node (that we call
i) from a subset Nh. Then, we know that the strategies
of the i agent, ei1 and e
i
2, are going to show a Hamming
distance equal to h between them. In order to count the
number of nodes of the GFSMG that are connected to
node i, let us count the number of strategies of the FSS
meeting the condition of being separated from the two
strategies of i agent (ei1 and e
i
2) by a Hamming distance
lower than 1/2. That is to say, let us count the size of
the set of strategies e that meet both conditions:
d(ei1, e) <
1
2
and d(ei2, e) <
1
2
(5)
Now, we can imagine a box containing all strategies e
meeting this condition. Although the composition of this
box depends on the chosen node i, specifically of his pair
of strategies, the size of the set of strategies in the box
depends just on m and h. Therefore, we write E(m,h)
for the set of strategies in the box (for a particular i node
from Nh) and E(m,h) for the number of strategies in the
box. Whenever we pick two strategies from this box (with
repetition), we are building an agent (a network node, say
j) who is going to have a connection to the chosen node i
of the subset Nh, thus Lij = 1. Then, by combining the
strategies from the set E(m,h) in pairs (with repetition),
we will get all the nodes that have a link with the chosen
node i. The only consideration is that, sometimes, when
the box of strategies E(m,h) corresponding to a partic-
ular node from Nh includes the particular node as one of
the elements, we must then substract a node (a pair of
strategies), in order not to consider the link between a
node and itself. This occurs for values of h < 1/2. Thus
the degree of the particular node i, also applicable to any
node belonging to Nh, is going to be:
k(m,h) =
(
E(m,h)
2
)
+ E(m,h) for h ≥ 1/2
k(m,h) =
(
E(m,h)
2
)
+ E(m,h)− 1 for h < 1/2 (6)
All nodes belonging to the same subset Nh will have
the same degree, k(m,h). However, the neighbors of each
node will be different, in the same way as the composi-
tion of the box of strategies (with meet condition (5))
associated to each node is different.
As an example, in the current section, we will calcu-
late E(m,h) for the particular case of m = 2, and we
will leave the calculation for general values of m for the
Appendix of this work. Table I can help us to under-
stand how to compute the values of E(m = 2, h). We are
interested in determining the size of those boxes of strate-
gies associated with nodes whose pair of strategies show
a Hamming distance of h (i.e. they differ in 2mh bits).
Thus, for each h value we choose one of the nodes belong-
ing to the subset Nh in order to show the particular set
of strategies included in the subset E(m,h) associated to
this node. In panel h = 0 of Table I one node is shown
as an example from the subset N0. Then, both strate-
gies of this node are identical (ei1 = e
i
2) and the box of
strategies associated to this node contains all strategies
that differ in 0 or 1 bit from ei1 = e
i
2, in order to meet
condition (5). The size of this set is E(m = 2, h = 0) = 5
strategies, that are shown in the box of strategies of the
same panel. Then, from this box of strategies, we can
built 15 different pairs of strategies, each of which repre-
sents a neighbor of the agent. But we will discount one
of them (i.e. that with the same two strategies as the
i node), in order not to consider a connection of the i
node with itself. Thus, the degree of the i agent results
in 14. And k(m = 2, h = 0) = 14 for all the nodes from
the subset N0. The cases h = 1/2, 1/4, 3/4 and h = 1 are
represented in other panels and correspond to nodes that
will be degree 2, 3, 0 and 0 in the FSMG with m = 2,
and belong to the subsets N1/4, N1/2, N3/4 and N1.
In order to obtain the degree distribution, it will be
useful to define the probability of finding a node in the
FSMG network whose strategies are separated by a Ham-
ming distance given by h, thus p(m,h) = NhN . whereN and Nh are actually functions of the m parameter.
Therefore p(m,h) is the probability of finding a node
whose degree is k(m,h) on the network. Then the degree
distribution is going to show a set of peaks. There will be
a peak for each of the possible values of k(m,h). Hence,
the maximum number of peaks is going to be the number
of values that can take the variable h (i.e. the different
subsets of nodesNh that could exist). Nevertheless, there
could be fewer peaks of this maximum value because
nodes belonging to two different subsets Nh′ and Nh′′
may have the same value of degree k(m,h′) = k(m,h′′),
as it occurrs in the example of m = 2, where k(m,h =
3/4) = k(m,h = 1) = 0. In the Appendix, we will show
that in general k(m,h = 1) = k(m,h = 1− 1/2m) = 0.
As we will prove in the appendix, the general expres-
sion for E(m,h) is:
E(m,h) =
min (k,δ′)∑
i=max (0,k−δ′)
(
k
i
)
δ′−J(i)∑
j=0
(
2m − k
j
)
(7)
8where J(i) = max(i, k − i), k = 2mh and δ′ = 2mδ
with δ = 1/2−1/2m. Applying Eq. (6) in order to obtain
k(m,h) and using p(m,h) = Nh/N , the degree distribu-
tion of GFSMG, that we call PFSMG(k), is parametrized
in terms of h:
p(m,h) =
2(H−1)
N
(
H
Hh
)
for h > 0
and p(m,h) =
2
2H + 1
for h = 0 (8)
Eq. (8) defines the probability of the values of the
degree distribution in terms of h, and Eq. (6) describes
the location of these values of degree also in terms of h.
There is a discrete distribution with a maximum of 2m
possible values where, not only the maximum number of
values of the degree but also their location and height
depend on only parameter m.
Now we focus on the mode of the degree of GFSMG
which is reached when h = 1/2. In this case, Nh and thus
p(m,h) reach the maximum value. Taking into account
the limit case of 2H = 22
m ≫ 1 and using the well known
approximation (which can be obtained straightforwardly
from Stirling’s formula) 12H
(
H
H/2
) ∼√ 2Hpi , we get
p(m,h =
1
2
) ≃
√
2
Hpi
In the Appendix, we will calculate the most probable
value of k, kmod, in the limit case of 2
H = 22
m ≫ 1,
which results in:
kmod = k(m,h =
1
2
) ≃ N
16
B. Estimating the degree distribution of MG
networks from that of FSMG networks
We could estimate the degree distribution ofGMG from
the degree distribution of GFSMG calculated in the pre-
ceding section. The idea is to think about an instance
of the MG of N agents as an statistical sample of size
N from the set of N agents of the FSMG. Then, the
set of nodes of a particular network GMG is a sample of
N size of all the nodes of the FSMG network, and the
GMG is the induced subgraph from the GFSMG by this
set of N nodes. This sample is selected at random, be-
cause the assignment of strategies to agents of the MG
is random. Thus, the new problem is well defined: we
have to choose N nodes at random, with repetition (as
in the MG there could be identical players) from the set
of N nodes of the GFSMG. So, regarding this problem,
the question is: how do we infer the degree distribution
of GMG (PMG(k˜)) from the known degree distribution
of GFSMG (PFSMG(k))? The relationship between N
and N tells us how representative the sample is. The
probability that a node of the FSMG be elected to form
the network of MG is q = N/N . As it was mentioned in
subsection A, the degree distribution of FSMG networks,
PFSMG(k), can take only a few values. The degree distri-
bution of MG network will also be discrete (by definition
of degree), but the variable may take any integer value,
k˜ (lower than the maximum value of degree of GFSMG),
with certain probability PMG(k˜) as we will see in the fol-
lowing. Going from FSMG to MG for a particular value
of m, we approximated PMG(k˜) as:
PMG(k˜) ⋍
∑
ki≥k˜
PFSMG(ki)
(
ki
k˜
)
qk˜(1− q)ki−k˜ (9)
where ki corresponds to the degree of the node belong-
ing to a given subset Nh, thus ki is one of the possible
values of k(m,h) so that k˜ ≤ k(m,h). To understand
Eq. (9), let us consider a node belonging to the sub-
set Nh for which the degree is ki. The probability that
each of the neighboring nodes of this node is chosen is q.
Therefore, the probability of this particular node which
has degree ki in the G
FSMG results with degree k˜ in the
GMG is approximately a Binomial(ki, q), which is the
probability that k˜ of his ki neighbors being elected (by
considering k˜ ≤ ki). The same expression was obtained
in [35] to study sampling process on networks. Here we
use the approximation symbol in Eq. (9) because we are
actually choosing exactly N nodes from N rather than
nodes with probability q = N/N . The binomial factor
has known variance and mean:
< k˜ >= kiq (10)
σ2
k˜
= kiq(1− q) (11)
Then the limit central theorem is used to approximate
the binomial factor of the distribution for a normal dis-
tribution, with the same values of variance and mean:
PMG(k˜) ⋍
∑
ki≥k˜
PFSMG(ki)
1√
2piσk˜
e−(k˜−<k˜>)
2/2σ2
k˜
(12)
For q << 1, we approximate σ ≃ √kq.
PMG(k˜) ⋍
∑
ki≥k˜
PFSMG(ki)Normal(kiq,
√
kiq) (13)
where we note Normal(µ, σ) as the normal distribu-
tion with mean µ and variance σ2. The estimated degree
distribution for MG network was compared with that ob-
tained in the realization of networks of the MG. In Fig-
ure 7 it is possible to see the agreement when N = 1001
9and m = 3. In this case, the degree distribution has
five peaks. Note that the maximum number of peaks is
23 = 8. The estimation of PMG(k˜ = 0), i.e. the prob-
ability of finding a disconnected node is remarkable. In
this case, PMG(k˜ = 0) = PFSMG(k = 0) = 0.035.
Finally, by considering the limit case of H ≫ 1 and
that all the agents of the FSMG have the value of degree
kmod mentioned in the previous section and calculated
in Eq. (A20) in the Appendix, the expected value of k˜
by sampling N nodes at random will be 〈k˜〉 ≃ qkmod ≃
N
N
1
16 ≃ N16 . Thus, the probability of finding links on the
GMG, in this limit case, is approximately c ≃ 116 .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This work is an attempt to characterize the implicit in-
teractions between MG agents as the links on a complex
network. We have formalized an underlying network for
the Minority Game, by quantifying the similarity of the
strategies between a pair of agents. Given the resulting
definition of the link, it can be said that in the MG re-
gion characterized by the presence of crowds, the under-
lying network can be identified as a small world network,
whereas in the region where the system behaves like in
a game of random decisions, the underlying network be-
haves as a random one, showing the same clustering coef-
ficient, degree distribution and minimal path as a random
Erdos-Renyi network. The transition between these two
types of networks is gradual, that is why we cannot char-
acterize the coordination region of the agents through a
static network, which only contains information on the
available strategies of the agents. In a context of non-
ergodicity, similarities in the available set of strategies
does not shed light on the actual moves of the agents.
This fact poses a question on whether it would be possi-
ble to characterize the behavior of the game in the coor-
dination region through a dynamic network, which also
uses information regarding the strategies actually used
during the game.
We have analytically calculated the degree distribution
for the underlying network of the Full Strategy Minority
Game (FSMG) model, and from this result, we have es-
timated the degree distribution of MG networks, with a
very good agreement with the obtained results from sim-
ulations. This again shows how useful the FSMG is to
understand the MG.
In the future it would be interesting to explore the ef-
fect of using weighed links in these networks. Addition-
ally, in those cases where explicit interactions between
some agents are introduced, as for example when some
agents receive information from their neighbors, it could
be helpful to consider the combined effects of explicit in-
teractions network and the underlying interactions net-
work formalized here. Let us remember that in the re-
gion of coordination of the agents, the population as a
whole achieves more resources, but the inequality among
the agents is maximized in the coordination [19]. An in-
teresting approach is to study if coevolutionary rules on
the Minority Game can induce cooperation mechanism
in this region as occurs in other social dilemmas [39].
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Appendix A
Firstly, we will prove Eq. (4), in which the sum of the
number of agents of each subset Nh over all the values
of h results in N , the total number of agents. Let us
remember that h can take the values on the set Sh =
{0, 12m , 22m , ..., 1}. Thus h can be written as h = f/2m,
being f an integer number from 0 to 2m. According to
Eq. (3), the sum of Nh for all values of h can be written
as:
∑
h ∈ Sh
Nh =
∑
h ∈ Sh−{0}
2(2
m−1)
(
2m
2mh
)
+ 22
m
(A1)
we rewritte Eq. (A1) as:
∑
h ∈ Sh
Nh = 2(2m−1)A+ 22m (A2)
where
A =
∑
i ∈ {0,1,...,2m}
(
2m
i
)
−
(
2m
0
)
= 22
m − 1 (A3)
By replacing Eq. (A3) in Eq. (A2) we obtain the
sought result:
∑
h ∈ Sh
Nh = (2
2m − 1)22m
2
+ 22
m
=
(
22
m
2
)
+ 22
m
= N
(A4)
Secondly, we will go on to detail how we carried out the
calculation of E(m,h). As mentioned in III A, E(m,h)
is the set of strategies from which one can choose a pair
of strategies to construct a node that will have a link
with some particular node of the subset Nh. Thus, the
set E(m,h) associated to the particular node i whose
strategies are ei1 and e
i
2 is defined as the set of strategies
that meet the condition of Eq. (5):
10
d(ei1, e) <
1
2
and d(ei2, e) <
1
2
(A5)
As we just mentioned, althougth the composition of
E(m,h) depends on the particular node selected from
Nh, the size of the set, E(m,h), is the same for all the
nodes belonging to Nh. Thus E(m,h) is only a function
of m and h.
As h can take only the values of the set{
0, 12m ,
2
2m , ...,
2(m−1)−1
2m ,
1
2 , ..., 1
}
, by calling the treshold
value
δ =
1
2
− 1
2m
, (A6)
condition (A5) becomes
d(ei1, e) ≤ δ and d(ei2, e) ≤ δ (A7)
Note that δ is actually a function of m, althought we
only write δ (and not δ(m)) in order not to complicate the
notation. For example, for the case of m = 2, δ = 1/4,
and for the case of m = 3, δ = 3/8.
Before presenting the calculation for E(m,h), let us
mention one aspect related to the transitivity of the Ham-
ming distance between two strategies. Let us suppose
that the Hamming distance between two strategies e1
and e2 is h, thus d(e1, e2) = h. And let us also consider
a strategy e which differs from e1 in exactly 2
ma bits.
Thus, d(e1, e) = a. What can we then said about the
Hamming distance between e and e2, d(e2, e)? We can
say that d(e2, e) is limited by two boundaries:
|h− a| ≤ d(e2, e) ≤ h+ a (A8)
The high boundary (h+a) is reached when all the bits
in which e differs from e1 are chosen from those bits for
which e1 and e2 coincide (and thus a < 1 − h). And
the low boundary (|h− a|) is reached when all the bits
in which e differs from e1 are chosen from those bits for
which e1 and e2 differ (when a ≤ h); or when all the bits
in which e differs from e1 are all those bits for which e1
and e2 differ (2
mh) more other bits in which e1 and e2
coincide (when a > h). Once this property is described,
we will focus on the calculation for E(m,h).
Let us consider a particular node belonging to the set
Nh, whose strategies are e1 and e2, thus d(e1, e2) = h.
In order to count the size of the set of strategies e that
meet condition (A7), let us consider two sets of bits: the
set Bh of those h2m bits in which e1 and e2 differ, and
the complementary set of (1− h)2m bits in which e1 and
e2 coincide, that we call B¯h. Let us consider a strategy e
so that d(e1, e) = a; thus, e differs in a2
m bits from e1.
Additionally, let us suppose that b2m of these bits belong
to the set Bh, and c2m of these bits belong to the set B¯h,
so that b+ c = a. Then, the Hamming distances between
strategies are:
d(e1, e) = b+ c (A9)
d(e2, e) = h− b+ c (A10)
Now we can ask what possible values b and c can take
so that strategy e meets the condition (A7), knowing
that 0 ≤ b ≤ h and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 − h. Hence, b + c ≤ δ and
h−b+c ≤ δ. As a consequence 0 ≤ c ≤ δ−max(b, h− b)
and max (0, h− δ) ≤ b ≤ min (h, δ). Now we can write
E(m,h) =
min (2mh,2mδ)∑
i=max (0,2m(h−δ))
(
2mh
i
)
2mδ−J(i)∑
j=0
(
2m(1 − h)
j
)
(A11)
being i an integer number between values 0 and 2mh
when h ≤ δ and between values 2m(h− δ) and 2mδ when
h > δ; j is another integer number between values 0
and 2mδ − J(i) where J(i) = max (i, 2mh− i). The first
factor in Eq. (A11) represents all the ways in which we
can choose i bits from the set Bh, and the second factor,
all the ways in which we can choose j bits from B¯h in
order to construct a strategy e which differs in i+ j bits
from e1 and in 2
mh− i+ j bits from e2.
A particular case included in Eq. (A11) is the case
of h = 0. In this case, for a particular node belonging
to the set Nh=0, both of its strategies are equal, thus
d(e1, e2) = 0. If we replace h = 0 in previous equation,
we obtain
E(m,h = 0) =
2mδ∑
j=0
(
2m
j
)
(A12)
which represents the total number of strategies e which
differ in 0, 1, ..., 2mδ bits from e1, i.e. the size of the set of
strategies that meet the condition d(e1, e) = d(e2, e) ≤ δ.
Another particular case is the h = 2δ case. If we re-
place h = 2δ in Eq. (A11) we obtain
E(m,h = 2δ) =
(
2δ2m
δ2m
)
(A13)
which can be understood because, for a particular node
of the set Nh=2δ, whose strategies are (e1, e2), there is
only one possibility for which strategy e differs from e1
and from e2 in less than 2
mδ bits, or is equal to 2mδ bits.
The possibility is that e differs exactly in 2mδ bits both
from e1 and from e2, and that those bits in which e differs
from e1 and e2 should be chosen from those in which e1
and e2 differ. Because if we consider strategy e so that
d(e1, e) = a = δ, then the low boundary for the distance
d(e2, e) = 2δ − a = δ is reached only in this condition.
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Lastly, another interesting case involves two values of
h: h = 1 − 12m and h = 1 (both strategies of a node are
opposite), which correspond to the case 2δ < h ≤ 1. In
this case, using Eq. (A11) we obtain E(m, 2δ ≤ h ≤ 1) =
0. This fact can be understood because if we choose
strategy e so that d(e1, e) ≤ a where a ≤ 1/2 − 1/2m,
then necessarily d(e2, e) ≥ h−a. Then the low boundary
h − a ≥ 12 when h = 1 − 12m , and h − a ≥ 12 + 12m ≥ 12
when h = 1. As a consequence, d(e2, e) ≥ 12 and there is
not any possible strategy emeeting condition (A7). That
is why E(m, 2δ ≤ h ≤ 1) = 0. And for this fact we said
that, as a maximun, the amount of peaks of degree for
the GFSMG is 2m. Because there are always two cases of
h (h = 1 and h = 1− 1/2m) for which the degree has the
same value, 0.
Finally, the case of m = 2 described in the main part
of the manuscript can be obtained by replacing m = 2 in
previous analytical expressions:
E(m = 2, h = 0) = 1 + 2m = 5
E(m = 2, h = 1/4) = 22
mδ = 2
E(m = 2, h = 1/2) =
(
2
1
)
= 2
and E(m = 2, h = 3/4) = E(m = 2, h = 1) = 0
Thirdly, we will calculate the value of the most prob-
able degree for GFSMG network, that we call kmod, and
whose probability is PFSMG(kmod). The maximum value
of p(m,h) is reached when Nh is maximum, which occurs
when h = 1/2. In the main part of the manuscript, we
have already discussed that in the limit case of H ≫ 1
this probability is approximately
√
2
Hpi (see the final part
of section IIIA).
Let us calculate E(m,h = 1/2) in order to obtain the
value of the most probable degree on the network, kmod.
We will now rewrite the expression of Eq. (A11) for the
case of h = 1/2:
E(m,h = 1/2) =
H/2−1∑
i=1
(
H/2
i
)
H/2−1−J(i)∑
j=0
(
H/2
j
)
(A14)
with J(i) = max(i,H/2 − i). Expression (A14) is
the sum of some of the products of pairs of combina-
torial coefficients in the form
(
H/2
i
)(
H/2
j
)
. By calling
C = E(m,h = 1/2) the following expression is met (see
[38] for a hint):
4C+2
H/2∑
i=0
(H/2
i
)2
−
(H/2
H/4
)2
=
H/2∑
i=0
(H/2
i
)2 (A15)
By solving the two sums, Eq. (A15) is reduced to:
4C + 2
( H
H/2
)
−
(H/2
H/4
)2
= 2H (A16)
In the limit case of H ≫ 1 , we approximate ( HH/2) ∼
2H
√
2
Hpi (by using the Stirling’s formula) and then:
C ≃ 2H
[
1
4
+
1
piH −
1√
2piH
]
(A17)
In the limit case of E(m,h = 1/2) ≫ 1, thus kmod ≃
C2/2, we replaced Eq. (A17) in Eq. (6) to obtain the
value of the kmod:
kmod ≃ 2
2H
2
[
1
16
− 1
2
√
2piH +
1
piH −
√
2
(piH)3/2 +
1
(piH)2
]
(A18)
As in the limt case of H ≫ 1 we can approximate
N ≃ 22H2 , then
kmod
N ≃
1
16
− 1√
8
a−1/2 + a−1 −√2a−3/2 + a−2 (A19)
being a = piH. Finally, in the limit case of a ≫ 1
(H ≫ 1) we obtain the expression:
kmod
N ≃
1
16
(A20)
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FIG. 5. Black symbols are the clustering coefficient as a func-
tion of m for games with different number of agents N (circle
symbols for N = 5001 case, plus for 1001, triangle for 501
and X for 101 case). In all cases, the results shown are aver-
ages over 100 different instances. Gray symbols are the link
probability just reported in Figure 1. The inset of the figure
shows values of clustering coefficient for the case of m = 6 for
different values of m; error bars are the standard deviation
obtained over the 100 instances. Error bars corresponding
to the N = 5001 case are smaller than the size of the sym-
bols. A χ2 statistical test cannot reject the null hypothesis
H0: “the values obtained from N = 101, 501, 1001 and 5001
are mutually consistent (i.e., correspond to variables with the
same mean value)” for any value of m. The figure inset re-
ports the values corresponding to m = 6 with error bars for
different values of N . For each value of m we performed a
χ2 statistical test on means in order to check the null hy-
pothesis H0: “the four values are mutually consistent within
these error bars, i.e., the obtained values of clustering coef-
ficient for N = 101, N = 501 N = 1001 and N = 5001
correspond to measurements of variables with the same mean
value, and normal distribution” [33]. We computed the sta-
tistical value S as the weighed sum of the squared deviations
from the weighed average value of the four measurements (x),
i.e., S =
∑
4
i=1 (xi − x)2/∆x2i where xi and ∆xi are the vari-
able and error corresponding to the i case (i.e. each one of
the obtained clustering coefficients for GMG with N = 101,
N = 501, N = 1001 and with N = 5001 agents) and x is
the maximum likelihood estimator of the mean of the four
values. When H0 is true, S is approximately a χ23 Chi-square
distribution with 3 degrees of freddon (because the parame-
ter x is estimated from data) [33]. For m = 2, we obtained
S = 0.0013; for m = 3, S = 0.0009; for m = 4, S = 0.0009;
for m = 5, S = 0.0006; for m = 6, S = 0.000008, for m = 7,
S = 0.0007; for m = 8, S = 0.0002; for m = 9, S = 0.00003;
for m = 10, S = 0.0006; for m = 11, S = 0.00005; for
m = 12, S = 0.00002; for m = 13, S = 0.0004 and for
m = 14, S = 0.0006. For this reason H0 cannot be rejected
for any value of m.
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FIG. 6. Big symbols: minimum mean path as a function of m
for games with different number of agents. In each case of MG
network, data show the mean value and standard deviation of
100 instances (each instance consists in a different assignment
of strategies to the agents). Small symbols: minimum mean
path for Erdos-Renyi networks (GER) with the same value of
N and 〈k〉 as GMG, we used the igraph of R project package
to simulate them and to calculate the minimum mean path
[37], [36].
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h = 0 h = 1/4
chosen box of chosen box of
node i strategies node i strategies
ei1 e
i
2 E(m = 2, h = 0)
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0
E(m = 2, h = 0) = 5
k(m = 2, h = 0) =
(
5
2
)
+ 5 − 1 = 14
ei1 e
i
2 E(m = 2, h = 1/4)
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
E(m = 2, h = 1/4) = 2
k(m = 2, h = 0) =
(
2
2
)
+ 2 − 1 = 2
h = 1/2 h = 3/4 h = 1
chosen box of chosen box of chosen box of
node i strategies node i strategies node i strategies
ei1 e
i
2 E(m = 2, h = 1/2)
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
E(2, h = 1/2) = 2
k(m = 2, h = 1/2) =
(
2
2
)
+ 2 = 3
ei1 e
i
2
1 0
1 0 ∅
1 0
1 1
k(h = 3/4) = 0
ei1 e
i
2
1 0
1 0 ∅
1 0
1 0
k(h = 1) = 0
TABLE I. Each panel corresponds to a particular value of h ∈
{0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1}. In each panel we exemplify a particular
node chosen from Nh (chosen node i) and for this node, the
set of strategies E(m = 2, h) which meet the condition of Eq.
(5) (box of strategies), and the size of this set E(m,h), which
is applicable to every node from Nh. Finally, we calculate the
degree of the nodes from the Nh set, k(m,h).
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FIG. 7. In gray, degree distribution for MG networks, for
N = 1001 and m = 3. Histogram is an average over 100 dif-
ferent instances. The continuous black line shows PMG(k˜),
the degree distribution estimated using the degree distribu-
tion of FSMG, PFSMG(k). The inset shows PFSMG(k) for
m = 3: P (k = 4370) = 0.0078; P (k = 1710) = 0.14;
P (k = 740) = 0.49 (actually there are two values of de-
gree which were joined: 740, for the case of h = 3/8, and
741, for the case of h = 1/2); P (k = 210) = 0.33 and
P (k = 0) = 0.035.
